Content note: this statement contains references to violence, murder, and potential war crimes.
Today marks two years since the Myanmar military initiated a deadly coup, ripping the country out of democratic transition. More than 700 days since the start of the coup and this bloody invasion now extends to the digital sphere where the military’s tightening stranglehold translates to brutal rights violations against the people. Ahead of the so-called elections later this year, the military continues to build and implement a complex attack and surveillance infrastructure with the help of private businesses. Myanmar’s telecommunications sector is now entirely controlled by the military – setting the stage for unprecedented surveillance. When the last two internationally-owned telecom operators in Myanmar, Telenor and Ooredoo, sold their operations in the country, the military gained the power to activate intercept surveillance across networks — a way to track, target, and eliminate those who resist the regime. It also now has access to a propaganda infrastructure that can spread the military’s violent calls as often as possible. It was recently reported that prior to the coup, Israeli company, Cognyte Software Ltd, won a tender to sell intercept spyware to a state-backed telecommunications firm in Myanmar. The military continues to shut down the internet to hide brutal human rights violations. Internet, wifi, mobile and landline connections are regularly shut down, most often in regions where resistance against the military is strongest. Communications blackouts are often imposed to shroud killings, ill-treatment, village burning, and other serious abuses. In 2022, all townships in Myanmar have experienced internet shutdowns. When people are online, they are subjected to constant surveillance, doxxing, rampant discriminatory hatred, and violent incitement. The military and military-linked actors dart from one platform to another, spreading hateful and violent propaganda to provoke real world harms. Actors inciting hate primarily use Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, and Telegram, and easily reestablish accounts and online followings if and when companies finally remove their content. There have been numerous arrests of people who have used social media posts to support the resistance movement. Doxxing on Telegram is continuing unabated, as personal information and sexual content is shared on channels with thousands of followers, facilitating vigilante violence, mass shaming, and harassment, especially against women. Telegram must invest in addressing these harms and engage with civil society to put in place rights-based safeguards. People are forced to surrender personal data that the military can use to facilitate more harm. SIM card and IMEI registrations are now required, and those who refuse to comply are immediately cut off from internet and mobile services. From these registrations, the military can gather residence addresses and location data or set the stage for false accusations of financing terrorism leading to deactivating mobile payment accounts. Surveillance online and on the streets is a daily reality in Myanmar, and freedom of movement is severely restricted. Closed circuit television (CCTV) systems with facial recognition technology are now in at least ten cities and the infrastructure continues to expand in other parts of the country. These CCTVs are being sold by Zhejiang Dahua Technology, Huawei Technologies Co Ltd, and Hikvision — businesses that have been sanctioned for their products’ use in Xinjiang, China, where surveillance has allegedly facilitated crimes against humanity. Reports are also emerging that military officers are conducting random house visits in villages and phone checks on the streets. Passport issuance has also stopped since December 2022, preventing people from leaving the country. As long as the military remains desperate to gain international legitimacy, there is leverage to resist this coup, both online and offline. Continued inaction costs lives. The international community must: Companies must: Signatories: Access Now ACDD Article 19 Athan -Freedom of Expression Activist Organization CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation Digital Resilience Asia (DRA) Digital Rights Collective EngageMedia Enlightened Myanmar Research Foundation (EMReF) Free Expression Myanmar Foundation for Media Alternatives Heartland Initiative Nar Sin Thu Myar Nyan Lynn Thit Analytica Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) Pen America Reporters without Borders SAFENet-Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network Sisters2Sisters Spring Sprouts Thai Netizen Network Yuyun Wagyuningrum, Chair and Indonesia Rep to the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights