Myanmar’s online space is severely restricted. The military increasingly abuses digital tools to track and target people, facilitating serious human rights violations and offline attacks:

• Targeted internet shutdowns that facilitate and shroud serious human rights violations, including of the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, association and assembly, security, life, education, health, and an adequate standard of living, are currently targeting all townships in Myanmar. 

• Expansion of surveillance infrastructure, including the procurement and installation of biometric tools, have strengthened the military’s ability to track and target individuals’ movements, networks, communications, and personal information. They will — potentially also facilitate the railroading of subservient voting in military-imposed elections. 

• Takeover of thetelecommunications industry following the exit of Telenor and Ooredoo — the last non-military connected telcos operating in the country — and the activation of intercept surveillance technologies across national networks is seriously undermining privacy and security, and facilitating the increased targeting of human rights defenders.

The junta is using targeted internet shutdowns in areas where resistance is strongest — Karenni, Kachin, Sagaing, Magway, and Chin — to isolate and prevent documentation of its violence. The systematic blockings of internet connections often coincide with protests and burning of villages known to be opposition strongholds. When the military shuts down the internet, people cannot access life-saving information as they flee their homes.

Since the start of 2022, all 330 townships in the country have been subjected to shutdowns at least once, and more than 50 townships have been cut off for almost two years.

Find out more about internet shutdowns in Myanmar by reading Access Now’s report, Weapons of control, shields of impunity: Internet shutdowns in 2022.

The military is determined to strengthen its ability to track and target people in Myanmar, and is deploying:

• An expanded network of CCTV and facial recognition technologies, some of which have been purchased from Chinese companies implicated in rights violations in Xinjiang.

• Revamped SIM card and IMEI registration measures that require people to disclose personal details to military-controlled or linked telecommunications companies,  where intercept technologies are already activated to monitor communications.

• Building a national database connecting national ID and household registration data with personal information like addresses, fingerprints, photos, and banking details.

All four of Myanmar’s telecommunications companies are now military-owned or controlled by companies with close links to the military, making it  easy to order the activation of intercept technologies that can monitor people’s communications and location. These are following:

• Nine Communications, a Singapore-based subsidiary of Link Family Office and military-linked Nyan Win, which bought out Ooredoo.

• M1 Group, which bought Telenor Myanmar through its Singapore-registered entity, Investcom Pte Ltd — the majority of which is owned by the military-linked Shwe Byain Phyu Group.

• Myanma Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), a state-backed telecommunications company.

• Mytel, a venture between the military and Viettel, owned by Vietnam’s defense ministry.

Aside from the self-censoring effect when personal communications are blatantly monitored, the military is also curtailing freedom of expression by making it infinitely more difficult to access and use telecommunications and internet services: 

• Price hikes and onerous SIM card registration requirements make it difficult for people to access the internet, especially given the dire economic challenges worsened by the coup.

• Phone seizures and hacking are being abused by the military to monitor and target individuals deemed to oppose the regime, as well as members of their families and communities. 

• The draft Cybersecurity Law  threatens to criminalize the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) — a  vital tool for anyone attempting to safely navigate online spaces through their computers and mobile devices. 

• Bylaws under the Counterterrorism Law are facilitating the interception of personal communications and dramatically increasing the online and offline risks faced by people voicing opposition to the military — with severe penalties.

• Continuously and transparently engage in dialogue with civil society to effectively identify and address human rights challenges and risks that may arise from decisions about their operations in Myanmar. 

• Conduct heightened due diligence in line with international human rights standards to ensure that their products and services are not being used by the military or military-controlled actors to violate human rights, and immediately remove tools used to facilitate rights abuses from the market.

• Immediately implement safeguards and redress mechanisms to protect users at risk, including data protection and privacy safeguards to resist increasing attempts to extend surveillance, censorship, and rights violations, and actively and regularly engage key stakeholders on mechanisms for redress and accountability.
  

For more information, see guidance documents from Access Now:

• Tech and conflict: a guide for responsible business conduct
• Telco Action Plan: Respecting Human Rights: Ten Steps and Implementation Objectives for Telecommunications Companies

• Demand accountability from authorities responsible for internet shutdowns used to facilitate and shroud gross human rights violations and alleged war crimes. 

• Help provide alternative means for people in Myanmar to safely access the internet.

• Call for a comprehensive arms embargo, including a ban on the sale or transfer of surveillance technologies, equipment, intelligence or related assistance to the military, particularly “dual-use” and biometric technologies enabling mass and discriminatory targeted surveillance.

• Provide tangible funding and assistance to people in Myanmar facing immense risks and challenges navigating increasingly complicated visa, documentation, and relocation challenges. 

• Continue to keep political attention and will on Myanmar, by highlighting the deteriorating human rights crisis at the international, regional, and local levels. It is particularly vital to engage in countries where companies with investments in Myanmar are headquartered, where efforts to sanction military-linked officials have been robust, and where there are ongoing legal efforts to hold military officials to account.

• Support civil society and grassroots efforts, including the work of youth activists, education service providers, and women human rights defenders, in resisting the junta through advocacy.